8th July 1944 - Bieville and Lebisey Wood

The Battalion first heard that it was to have the honour of leading the Allied Armies into Caen on the afternoon of 7th July 1944. After three weeks in the line at Cambes, we had been pulled out for a rest at St Aubin d'Arquenay, but had only been there for a single day when we were ordered to move forward again to positions behind 185 Brigade at Bieville prior to passing through them into Caen.

The plan was as follows: 185 Brigade was to capture Lebisey Wood, and, having consolidated, to seize the high ground above Caen on Ring Contour 60. The 2nd Battalion The Royal Ulster Rifles, supported by 1st Battalion The Kings Own Scottish Borderers, was to move up to the heights and, from there, thrust down into Caen.

The first half of this plan consisted of a deliberate attack, based upon information about the strength and dispositions of the enemy which had been accumulated since D Day. The second half, in which the Battalion was to be committed, depended entirely upon the progress and success of the first. Our task was to maintain the momentum of the first assault and to pursue the enemy to the far side of the river Orne.

185 Brigade launched their attack at 0400 hours 8th July. Shortly afterwards, our own Brigade moved forward into the positions from which 185 had gone forward. It was a clear night with a full moon, and as we moved forward, we could see the flashes and hear the rumble of the tremendous barrage which pounded the enemy for some hours before zero. By dawn, we were secure in Bieville, providing a firm base for the 185 attack.

By 1000 hours the objective Lebisey Wood was reported taken; but mopping up and consolidation took time and not until 1500 hours did the reserve battalion of 185 Brigade, the 2nd K. S. L. I., begin the advance towards Ring Contour 60.

Lebisey Wood 8 July 1944 - German prisoners captured by 185th Brigade (IWM)

Meanwhile the Commanding Officer was making his reconnaissance and evolving a plan with the Commander of the supporting tank unit, the 1st Northants Yeomanry, assisted by Major W. D. Tighe-Wood and Captain A. C. Bird, commanding the two forward companies. At 1430 hours the Battalion moved forward and debouched from Lebisey Wood towards Ring Contour 60 at 1730 hours.

At this time no news of the progress of the K. S. L. I. had reached us, nor had we heard anything of enemy dispositions behind Lebisey Wood.

However it was obvious from the viewpoint of Lebisey that the Boche was shelling intensively the whole area between the wood and Ring Contour 60, by using as O.Ps the chimneys of the factories at Colombelles lying on the south side of the Orne to the N. F. of Caen. These chimneys constituted too small a target for the RAF or for our own gunners, yet they dominated the battle field, and made the passage of our troops a difficult one.

Lebisey Wood, 8 July - Universal carriers and 6-pounder anti-tank guns (IWM)

A and D Companies, however, moved forward according to plan. At first, while they were operating in close touch with the tanks, the enemy barrage was not troublesome; but later the range was closed and some damage was done.

A Company had just established itself on the objective when Company Headquarters received a direct hit which wounded Major W. D. Tighe-Wood and a number of his staff. Captain C. G. Alexander took over command.

Major W D Tighe-Wood

Meanwhile liaison had been made with the K. S. L. I. and with supporting tanks providing admirable cover and protection against a counter attack, everyone dug in with the utmost rapidity. Little small arms fire had been met and prisoners were few, but the position was being continuously and accurately shelled.

Lebisey Wood 8 July 1944 - 33rd Armoured Brigade Sherman Tanks supporting 3rd Division (IWM)

A Company again suffered; this time its Stretcher Bearers were all wounded, and great work was done by Cpl Reid, Rfn A. Cranston and Rfn Devaney in bringing in and tending the wounded. B and C, the two reserve companies, who moved up to the position under heavy shellfire also suffered casualties.

By the time the whole Battalion was in position, it was getting late and the light was beginning to fail. We had about 80 casualties, mostly from shellfire, since such Germans as had been found on the objective were swiftly liquidated. Nevertheless, we were determined to make an effort to enter Caen that evening, and B Company under Major J. W. Hyde, with two troops of tanks, set off to probe the enemy positions in the Northern approaches to the town.

Some casualties on the start line were caused by an 88 mm gun, and opposition was encountered some 500 yards further on. The tanks were completely held up by the havoc and ruin wrought in bombing attacks by the RAF and our men themselves could only move forward with the utmost difficulty. Finally, mines were discovered on the track and its verges.

Rifleman Hugh Maguire who ultimately captured the 88mm gun and in the process also captured
SS Officer Anton Gecas. Hugh was subsequently awarded the Legion D'Honneur in October 2015.

It was considered unwise to continue this operation by night, and so B Company, under orders from the Commanding Officer, returned to their original positions.

9th July 1944 - Advance in to Caen

Early next morning, two more patrols were sent out. One platoon off A Company, under Lt R. Wise with a troop of tanks went down to Calix on the Eastern outskirts of Caen and, simultaneously, another platoon - also A Company - under Lt B. R. Burges moved to St Julien in the North West of the town.

The first patrol reached its objective and remained there until recalled later in the day. It had trouble with snipers and the Platoon Commander was himself wounded in the head. Lt Burges with his platoon readied St Julien, and then began an advance of his own accord into the heart of the town.

Lt Cyril Rand of 2 RUR in Caen 9 July 1944 (IWM)

Some light resistance was brushed aside but later on the defences stiffened and casualties were sustained. Lt Burges was himself wounded, though able to retain control of his platoon, and two of his N. C. Os. were killed outright. Thereupon this patrol returned to its position at St Julien and did not link up again with the Battalion until the following day.

It may be said, however, that this platoon was the first into the heart of the town because the Canadians did not appear on the right until late in the afternoon and the forward elements of our own Battalion were not in Caen much before 1100 hours.

At 0930 hours 9th July the Battalion began their advance into Caen. B Company led the way progressing slowly but surely, systematically clearing the ruins of enemy. Small groups of retreating Germans were dealt with, but no organised opposition was met and abandoned machine gun posts and rocket apparatus testified to the swiftness of his withdrawal.

Owing to the rubble and devastation caused by the bombing, movement was slow and difficult. There was no question of vehicle movement here, and so throughout this advance the infantry relied solely and entirely upon their own resources.

By 1130 hours Major Hyde was astride the Boulevardes des Allies and the remainder of the Battalion was pressing forward.

Some casualties were sustained by D Company before moving off from Hill 60, where Lt Palmer and his Platoon Serjeant were both wounded and evacuated: but L/Sjt Bonass assumed command and led the Platoon calmly and efficiently for the rest of the action.

Lieutenant W E Palmer

When the main body of the Battalion readied down into the town, the advance soon assumed the air of triumphant progress rather than a calculated operation of war; the people of Caen were determined to make it so.

We discovered afterwards that they had suffered all the brutalities that had become commonplace in Europe. In addition they had seen their town laid waste in a series of RAF attacks, by their own friends, the British.

Members of 2 RUR in Caen 9 July 1944 (IWM)

If we were ever doubtful of a welcome reception, the first few hours in Caen put our minds at rest. Flags of Fighting France were draped out of windows, and the people poured out of their houses with greetings and glasses of wine.

On the Boulevardes we were met by the Captain of the Resistance Movement with several of his comrades who gave us "Liberté" as the password agreed upon by themselves and their Headquarters in London.

One of their number guided C Company along the Boulevardes and others proved themselves invaluable in disclosing hide-outs of German snipers and machine gunners. It may be said here that through the complete mastery of the language displayed by Major J. C. S. G. de Longueuil we were able to take full advantage of their assistance.

We met many other interesting people in Caen, two of whom may be mentioned here. One was Squadron Leader Sprawson, DFC, RAF whose Lancaster had been shot down near Caen on D Day and who had since then been sheltering with a patriot family in Caen itself. Having experienced RAF bombing at the receiving end, he was anxious to get back, and having paused for a brief moment at Brigade Headquarters to make a recording for the BBC, he hurried back to England.

Squadron Leader Eric Sprawson DFC of 106 Squadron was the pilot of an Avro Lancaster III that was shot down by a fighter over Caen on D-Day before being sheltered by a French family until the Royal Ulster Rifles liberated Caen on the 9th July - see Personal Accounts for more detail. 

The second was a Frenchman whom our men found to be widely travelled but who readied the peak of his popularity when he revealed himself an habitué of "Mooneys" in Belfast. Needless to say he was an old soldier.

The rest of the operation can be swiftly summarised. We pushed gradually down to the line of the River Orne and then systematically mopped up such disorganised resistance as remained.

Our most lasting impression and remembrance of Caen will be the magnificent spirit of friendship and co-operation displayed by its citizens. The men of The Royal Ulster Rifles will pay them lasting tribute and can hope to have done something towards forging a bond of mutual sympathy and friendship.

10th-17th July 1944 - Preparation for Troarn

On July 10th we were relieved by a Battalion of the 3rd Canadian Division in Caen, which it had entered some two days before. We moved to the outskirts of La Deliverande and having been in the line with a break of but a single day since D Day, we made the most of a few days rest. Here it became known that we were to take part in a full scale offensive which was to be launched East of the River Orne.

We moved by night in transport to the Orne, crossed the river on foot and arrived in Amfreville in the early hours of the morning of 16th July. The weather was fine and the Battalion, dug in by first light, had two days rest in the new position.

In that time the plan for the attack became known. Three British Armoured Divisions were involved in a thrust which was to constitute the first powerful attempt to break out of the bridgehead. Their objective was Bretteville and finally Falaise and our Division had the task of covering the left flank of this advance by dominating the ground as far East as Troarn.

8th Brigade were to capture three villages - Trouffreville, Sanneville, and Banneville, and 9th Brigade were then to pass through, swing East and capture Troarn.

2 RUR were ordered, as part of 9th Brigade, to move on Troarn from the North East while 1st KOSB attacked from the East.

On the evening of July 17th, the Commanding Officer gave out his orders. Much valuable information was given by the officers of the 8th Parachute Battalion who had reached Troarn in the early stages of the campaign and patrolled the area constantly for three weeks after D Day. They had much to say about the nature of the country and gave detailed description of such features as the Brickworks, and the approaches to them. Air photographs had already revealed the close character of the country with its high banks and thick, almost impenetrable hedges, but this account of the battleground at first hand was most helpful and the Battalion was grateful to these officers for their assistance.

The plan itself was dictated by the nature of the ground. With tanks of the East Riding Yeomanry in close support the Battalion was confined to the roads and tracks since the hedges were thick enough to be impenetrable by Shermans. The thrust forward was then to be on a one company front, and led by an advance guard of B Company, and supporting arms under Major Hyde.

18th-20th July 1944 - Approach to Troarn

On 18th July at 1000 hours the Battalion moved to an assembly area at Le Mesnil some 11/2 miles to the South and thence to a forming up position a mile East of Sanneville. The weather was extremely close and the heat and dust made this march a tiring one although in distance it was relatively short. Meanwhile 8th Brigade had reported their objectives taken and all was now ready for our own advance.

At 1730 hours Major Hyde moved from the start line towards the first objective, which was the Brickworks half a mile North East of Sanneville. Through the village, the bridge over a stream was reported destroyed and covered by fire. A scissors bridge was soon put down by the supporting tanks, and our men dealt swiftly with the rifle and machine gun fire on the other side.

The advance continued to the Brickworks where another group of enemy were encountered. After an exchange of fire, these withdrew, but straight away a concentration of mortar fire was put down.

Cpl McCullough in charge of the leading section ordered his men into the cover of a building but remained himself in the open without concern for his own safety to tend one of his section who was badly wounded. He remained in the open until the stretcher bearers arrived when he assisted in bringing the wounded man into the building.

During this skirmish Captain Baudains, MM, second in command B Company, was wounded in the arm. He had organised the Company fire support and continued so to do after sustaining his wound until ordered to return to the RAP which he only did under protest.

B Company soon established themselves in the Brickworks, and when C Company had come up to take over this objective, Major Hyde continued his advance along the track running North East to the junction with the main road South East into Troarn which was the second objective. This was soon made and consolidated and C Company came up to strengthen the position on the right hand side of the track from the Brickworks.

Towards dusk, A and D Companies moved into position behind B and C so that the Battalion was well concentrated by darkness.

Meanwhile the forward platoon of B Company had been troubled by two 75 mm German guns which opened fire on this platoon and caused casualties. Though out of his platoon area, Lt Lyttle at once gathered together a few available men and put in a flanking attack on the first gun.

Under his orders L/Cpl Sharpe and two numbers of his Bren gun team, Rfn Charles and Rfn McNally, crossed the road under intense fire and took up positions not 50 yards from the gun, to pour in a steady, deadly fire.

Meanwhile Lt Lyttle himself put in the assault with two men, killing one German and capturing six others. Immediately he attacked the second gun, the crew of which fled. Lt Lyttle gave chase but came upon a strong dug in position from which he came under heavy fire which prevented him from capturing it. But the dash and determination of Lt Lyttle and his men had been rewarded for both guns fell into our hands.

By night, contact was established with the 5th Cameron Highlanders of the Highland Division who were operating further North on the Escoville - Troarn road. Patrols from both Divisions reconnoitred the buildings and church which lay about 600 yards to the East of the road. Our own patrol was from C Company under the command of Lt Purcell and returned with the information that this area was held by the enemy.

Next morning at 0300 hours the Commanding Officer gave out orders for continuing the advance towards Troarn. D Company under Captain Bird were primarily involved and they moved forward at about 0630 hours to the first objective - a small wood some half mile down the road towards Troarn - with a troop of tanks in support. This was secured without difficulty or opposition and A Company was about to pass through to initiate the next stage of the attack when it became apparent that opposition from the area of the church was constituting a severe threat to our left flank.

Leading up to this church and its few surrounding houses from the Escoville - Troarn road were two avenues, one running Eastward, the other North Eastward, the two forming up at the church. C Company-began to move on the church along the first of these but encountered bitter resistance a few hundred yards from the road.

The leading section, under Cpl Brown, though under fire from two directions, pressed forward, using the bayonet and hand grenades, killed seven Germans and was largely responsible for capturing thirteen others. Four machine guns were also captured by this section. But resistance remained determined and Lt Rand the leading Platoon Commander was wounded. C Company could make no further headway along this route.

A Company under Captain Alexander, then advanced up the more Southerly avenue towards the church. As the forward platoon advanced on both sides of the road a machine gun suddenly opened up at 30 yards range.

The supporting tanks were unable to engage it, and four men of the leading section were wounded. Sjt Sharkey commanding the leading platoon acted with great spirit and élan. Using a tank as cover he dashed to within 20 yards of the gun and then, darting out into the open, personally attacked the machine gun killing the crew with his Sten. This daring and courageous performance demoralised the enemy who withdrew, and A Company with supporting tanks took the church.

The enemy had been struck hard and many had been killed. Among these was a group of Germans with two Spandaus who were seen running for cover into a barn. This was set on fire by shots from the supporting tanks and no Germans were seen to emerge. The heat given out by the burning barn was so great that the forward section of A Company had to pull back about 50 yards.

A Company then withdrew, and as expected, the enemy infiltrated back into position in strength. When a tank officer returned towards the buildings on reconnaissance he was wounded, and an attempt to recover him cost A Company Lt Burges killed, and six other ranks wounded.

Thanks to this troublesome diversion it was late before A Company could be launched towards their original objective. This objective was a road junction about 800 yards out of Troarn, and A Company fought their way forward and took it.

An Anti-Tank gun on the objective opened up on one of our tanks and knocked it out. At the same time the leading platoon attempting to outflank it came under heavy machine gun fire.

Once again, Sjt Sharkey, with a depleted platoon, was prominent. In co-operation with two tanks he pushed forward with great determination and captured the post of six men, dashing from slit trench to slit trench with tremendous enthusiasm and courage. A number of the enemy were killed and another ten captured by this platoon.

By now it was almost dark, and Lt.Colonel Harris, committed to watching the opposition from the church, decided to withdraw A Company about 200 yards so that by night the Battalion would be more closely concentrated.

A standing patrol was posted on the road junction, but early next morning the enemy, strongly reinforced, returned and the patrol was compelled to give up its positions. 1 KOSB who had attacked Troarn from the East were held up 500 yards from the railway station.

On the morning of July 20th it became apparent that the enemy had rushed up reinforcements to hold this, a sector which was vital to him.

In fact a German coast defence battalion had motored through the night, to take up positions against us, and a contingent of tanks from 21 Panzer Division, some of which fired on our men during the day, had also moved towards us. These were engaged by our own six pounders and by SP anti-tank guns in support, and disappeared, thought to have been hit. But plainly an attack was not now within the scope of a Battalion, and there were other schemes afoot. Offensive action on this front was not resumed.

Within the Battalion casualties had been 4 officers and 98 other ranks, and although the final objective had not been attained, it had throughout given an excellent account of itself. Later, good work was given official recognition in the award of the M. C. to Lt Lyttle, the D. C. M. to Sjt Sharkey and the M. M. to Rfn Charles and Cpl Reid.

21st July to 31st July 1944 - Outside Troarn

We arrived in our positions before TROARN in the darkness, dug them during the night, and imagined that we should go forward from there at first light. We did not. Instead we sat in them for ten days - until the 31st July when we were relieved by another Division and despatched to the opposite end of the Second Army front.

These ten days were probably the most static that the Battalion had experienced. For the first three of them, we were pinned down by continuous rain, that same rain that checked the progress of the Armoured Divisions on our right. It made men loath to leave their slit trenches for any purpose, and yet reluctant to remain in them because they became so wet and damp.

In most places the soil was strong and this prevented the water, once in the trenches, from draining away. The positions were of necessity in open fields, and consequently the days were passed in the most unpleasant conditions that the Battalion had had to endure.

In many respects this period resembled the corresponding static period at Cambes Wood. Shelling and mortaring were both as intense, perhaps more so, because the Battalion position was more concentrated and when the Boche had found out where we were, he was able to shoot with accuracy and effect.

He also produced for the first time in our experience, the multi-barrelled mortar called Reihenwerfer, Panzerwerfer or Nebelwerfer in official terms, but to one and all it was known as "Moaning Minnie". This instrument is so named because in firing it emits the noise of rending canvas, and during time of flight, up to 20 seconds, its missiles give voice to a wail or whine which becomes louder and more menacing as it comes nearer.

All these infernal machines were accurately and frequently ranged onto our positions, but on the whole the casualties were lighter than at Cambes Wood because the troops had there learned the necessity for getting below ground and were here able to profit from this experience.

One of the principal dangers in this position came from the dust which rose so easily from the roads which led to our positions. After the rain, a fine spell of weather dried the road and soon the passage of vehicles throwing dust to the skies, became a menace to the troops: for although the country was very close and thick hedges and woods impeded observation of more than 200 yards at any point, the dust rose high above these obstacles and the Boche had little difficulty in spotting the approaches and destinations of traffic.

The chief sufferers were the RAP, the mortar platoon, and F Echelon, all of which were sited in and around the houses some 200 yards North East of the Brickworks. Supplies were brought up to F Echelon from A Echelon at Amereville, and when the food had been cooked it was then taken forward to the companies by jeep. Necessarily it was a hive of activity, and in spite of the most outspoken warning signs, trucks continued to raise dust, however slowly they travelled. Consequently this area received more than its share of shells.

Patrolling at this position was not so ambitious as at Cambes Wood. Our Battalion Battle Patrol had been much reduced in strength by casualties and consequently our activities were confined to reconnaissance patrols of positions to our immediate front. These produced, however, a fund of information which was swelled by several deserters who trickled into our position at various times.

The troops that faced us were German Air Force ground units whose morale was poor: their strength included many whose stock was not of purest German, and among the deserters were several Poles who disclosed the location of tanks, platoons, companies and HQs with the utmost nonchalance. We were able to hand over to our successors a fairly complete picture of the layout of the Boche defences in front of. us.

The plan devised at Cambes for sending a limited number of men to A Echelon for 48 hours rest was resumed in this position. A Echelon was stationed at Amfreville, near Breville some two miles East of the Orne. From here men could visit the Divisional Club at Luc sur Mer by this time fast recovering from the original impact of the invasion.

From here too, Sjt O'Reilly, Rfn Long and Rfn McGlennon, decorated for their bravery at the battle of Cambes, attended a parade at Cazelle when they received their decorations from the C in C. Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, KCB, DSO.

Video Footage of Corporal Cornelius O'Reilly DCM (7020028), Rifleman Jeremiah Long MM (7014577) and Rifleman Hugh Henry McGlennon MM (7012171), decorated for their bravery at the battle of Cambes and attended a parade at Cazelle on 27th July 1944 where they received their decorations from the Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, KCB, DSO.

Royal Ulster Rifles troops are distinguishable by their Caubeen berets with regimental badge over the right eye (rather than standard left eye) and it is likely that Corporal O'Reilly is the soldier being presented with his award at 1 minute 5 seconds in to the film, with other members of 2RUR visible in the group shots throughout. Lieutenant Colonel can be seen in his Side Cap chatting to Montgomery after 1 minute 45 seconds of footage.

Other parties went to the Corps Rest Camp at Aubin sur Mer a soldiers paradise where meals were served by the belles of the Normandy coast, and an early morning cup of tea was brought in at 0830 hours by a Serjeant-major.

These diversions helped us to carry through this period maintaining high spirits and looking forward with hope and confidence to whatever the future might bring.

30th July to 9th August 1944 - Bieville and Granville

After the stress and strain of the first two months of the campaign in France, the month of August was for 2 RUR, a month of peace and rest by comparison. The Battalion was relieved from its positions before Troarn on July 30th. Up to that date it had been in contact with the enemy, with only very brief intervals, since D Day.

On 30th July the Battalion was to move to a rest area at Cazelle for seven complete days rest, a rest to which officers and men alike had looked forward expectantly. At about this time the break through on the Allied right flank was achieved by the Americans, and the Second Army followed this with a spectacular advance on the Caumont sector. 3 Division from guarding the bridgehead across the Orne was now to become a follow up division in wake of the armour already deployed in action on the right

With that end in view we began a period of movement which contrasted with our previous experience in France. Hitherto we had been static as a battalion for long spells which were broken by occasional intensive periods of activity. Now our role was changed, for we became a much more mobile force.

On July 30th the first of these moves was carried out. The Battalion left the Troarn positions for Bieville, already well known to most of the men who had spent the night there before the attack on Caen. Here we snatched two days rest, which consoled us a little for having to forego seven.

Then the first of longer moves began. It was the first journey by motor transport that the Battalion had undertaken in France. The distance was about 25 miles, and the destination Granville, a little village some 10 miles North East from Villers Bocage.

Next day we moved another 30 miles West to a hamlet a mile beyond St Martin des Besaçes. in this location, though still remote from the enemy on the ground, the Battalion had the misfortune to lose a rifleman from C Company.

An Anti-Aircraft truck was blown up on a mine, and although the driver was lucky enough to escape, the explosion killed a rifleman who happened to be standing nearby. This was a grim reminder that even in a comparatively rear area, the utmost attention to these things had still to be maintained.

Next day we were on the move again, this time to a front much closer to the enemy. We were detailed to relieve the Norfolks in a position covering the arterial road running North East out of Vire.

Our task was to obstruct any possible enemy counter attack from Vire and to remain firm in our positions while the other two Battalions of the Brigade passed through us to the high ground further South. This was carried out without mishap and the Battalion in this position had no sight nor sound of the enemy.

During the next few days, from the 7th onwards, the Battalion changed position several times, but remaining throughout in Brigade reserve, not in direct contact with the Boche, but often within striking distance of his shells.

These bursts of shellfire fell unfortunately for the Battalion. One lasted only two minutes but in that time we lost CSM McCutcheon who had commanded the Mortar Platoon for the first six weeks after D Day, when the Mortar Officer was wounded. He was hit by shrapnel; so too was the Intelligence Sjt., Sjt. Hodgkinson, Sjt. Pancott, who had lead the snipers with great success since D Day, and several other Riflemen all of whom had to be evacuated.

On another occasion the Provost Sjt, Sjt Brown, was slightly wounded, but he too had to be evacuated. Throughout the campaign Sjt. Browns presence and steadiness in action had been of immense assistance and his departure was a great loss to the Battalion.

9th to 16th August 1944 - Vaudry

On 9th Aug the Battalion was given the task of capturing Vaudry, a little village to the East of Vire. The date was a significant one for the 2nd Battalion because on the 9th June we had fought and won at Cambes Wood, and on 9th July we had captured Hill 60 and entered Caen. Vaudry was a different proposition.

Careful reconnaissance of the ground was made by the Commanding Officer, Company and Platoon Commanders, and commanders of supporting arms, and orders were given to capture Vaudry, and consolidate beyond the village on the Vire - Vassy road. Simultaneously the 1 KOSB were to assault the high ground on the right of our objective.

On the night of the 8th, the Battalion moved to an assembly area at La Gallonerie, and after a short night moved off to attack Vaudry at 0600 hrs. It was soon obvious however that the enemy had abandoned his position and the only obstructions to our progress were a number of mines.

Our advance was now lead by the Pioneer Platoon, under command of Lt Shimmin, who swept conscientiously with their detectors, and the objective was finally taken personally by O. C. "5" Company, Captain Gaffikin, and O. C. Anti-Tank Platoon, Captain Gray, who were together searching out a suitable path for the Pioneers.

By 0930 hrs the whole Battalion was in position on and beyond the objective, some time after the KOSB who had reached their objective without even the obstruction of mines. Casualties had been nil and the Battalion had completed the easiest operation it had ever, or was ever likely, to be called upon to undertake.

We remained in and near Vaudry for a week, constituting, as part of 9 Brigade, a divisional reserve through which the other two Brigades passed to attack the enemy South East of Vire. During this time "B" Company came under the command of 1 KOSB, who had taken up an outlying position in Viessoix where earlier the Guards Armoured Division had fought a hard and bloody struggle with German Paratroops.

Once again we suffered occasionally from enemy shelling, and one particularly damaging salvo killed Sjt. McVeigh the MT Sjt., and wounded RSM Fleming. Sjt. McVeigh was one of the veterans of the Battalion, and the RSM had been a pillar of strength throughout the campaign. He had always kept flowing the supply of ammunition in the most trying conditions and his power of command and devotion to duty in these times had won him the admiration of the Battalion. The seriousness of his loss was tempered only by the fact that we hoped soon to have him back with us.

The only contact made with the enemy in this position was a strange one. Soon after we reached our final positions in Vaudry a patrol from "D" Company comprising Sjt Lynch, Cpl McDaid and six men on reconnaissance, saw moving Southwards from the Vire-Vassy road, a group of men whom they thought were Americans.

They called out a friendly greeting only to see the group spin round astonished, and disappear rapidly behind a hedge. The next thing they knew was that a shot from a Bazooka landed close by them, where upon they in turn took cover and returned the fire vigorously. They saw no more of these men who cleared out with the utmost speed and who can only have been a detached remnant of a Boche Platoon.

Not until the 17th was this Battalion called upon to take up the pursuit of the enemy, and by that time he was withdrawing swiftly into a fast contracting pocket. Two swift moves took us to Landisacq, about 4 miles West of Flers, without making contact, and by 20th it was clear that 3 Division had been squeezed out on the contracting front by the Americans on the right and the 11 Armoured Division on the left. We finished in Army reserve, having in that month travelled about 200 miles.

16th August to 15th September 1944 - Flers and Hacqueville

We watched August drift slowly into September near Flers, but soon after we had orders to move forward again. During this period British and American armoured formations were rolling across France, traversing stupendous distances each day.

In no time at all, the Battalion found itself two hundred miles behind the front line. Members of NAAFI and the ATS were further forward than ourselves.

Consequently we were glad on September 3rd to move to Hacqueville, a little village some eight miles East of Les Andelys-sur--Seine. The distance was about 150 miles and the journey was, for most people, an uncomfortable one.

All available transport had been centralized by Second Army to supply the forward and follow up Divisions, so that, being in reserve, we could only procure three tonners and not Troop Carrying Vehicles.

Additionally there was a scarcity of these, and the men, seated on Compo-Ration boxes, were bundled tightly together. The necessity for this was, however, fully understood by all ranks, and some of the hardship was mitigated by long halts and frequent libations of tea.

We were in Hacqueville by 1850 hrs having left Flers at 0400 hrs, and we were glad to find at the end of the journey an hospitable village in which all companies were able to live under cover.

The journey had been an interesting one, and we passed through many historical towns like Laigle, Verneuil, Breteuil, Louviers and Les Andelys itself, in all of which the convoy received a great welcome from the civilians.

We were also glad to see at first, hand the extent of the damage inflicted on the Boche in the recent advance, for, although we bypassed the principle scene of destruction, the Falaise Gap, German equipment was liberally spread about our route and it was exhilarating to see these fruits of success.

Once settled in Hacqueville, the Battalion resumed training. Many reinforcements had been absorbed since the days of Caen and Troarn, and section, platoon and company training was badly needed to restore that standard of controlled teamwork that had been achieved by D Day, and had proved itself in the initial battles.

An NCOs Cadre Course was begun, and some excellent counter mortar training, organised by the CRA, was carried out by our Intelligence Section and some NCOs from companies. We also had great pleasure in welcoming Brigadier C. H. L. Mole, DSO, MC, an old friend of the Battalion, who gave a lecture to our officers and the officers of the Lincolns on the assault crossing of the Seine, which had been carried out at VERNON.

This was particularly valuable to the Battalion, because our specialised role within the Division was assault river crossing and much valuable experience and advice was gained from this lecture.

Brigadier Mole had himself commanded the Assault Brigade and he brought with him his supporting gunner, Lt/Colonel Bishel, since killed in Holland, and Lt/Colonel Lipscombe, who commanded 4th Bn The Somerset Light Infantry, the left hand forward Battalion, so that we were given the whole story at first hand. This is a good opportunity to thank these officers for the trouble they took to give us the benefit of their experiences.

Apart from training, life in Les Andelys had its lighter sides. Five Pipers under Pipe Major Doyle from Kings Liverpool Irish had joined the Battalion at Flers, and now in Hacqueville we found ample occasion to use them.

On 5th September, for the first time in the history of the Battalion, the pipers played while the Adjutant mounted the Guard. Later they performed at a football match between the local team and our own men, and they gave many exhibitions up and down the main street.

The people were delighted and turned out in great numbers to watch and applaud. Subsequently they played with spirit when the Commander of our Brigade, Brigadier G. D. Browne, inspected the Battalion and took the salute at a march past.

Recreation was abundant in this area, in spite of severe petrol restrictions, imposed by the necessity of supplying the forward troops. Parties went to ENSA and Cinema shows in Gisors, to the Divisional Club, beautifully sited on the banks of the Seine in Les Andelys, and some even to Rouen.

Later trips to Paris were officially blessed and a small percentage of the Battalion was able to make one visit to this gay city before it was found necessary to discontinue them.

Such was the background to the crossing of the Escaut Canal towards which the Battalion began to move from Hacqueville on 16th September.

We had been out of contact for nearly six weeks and although the prolonged rest at Flers and Les Andelys was most welcome, we were all glad to move again to new lands and fresh contacts.

A period of static training in a theatre of war is a paradoxical state of affairs and most people found it an unsatisfactory one; so we started on 16th September well rested, looking forward to the future and glad to be able to close down on the past.

16th to 19th September 1944 - Crossing of the Meuse - Escaut Canal

On the night of 18/19 September, 2 RUR carried out an assault crossing of the Meuse - Escaut Canal. It was the Battalions first river crossing in North-West Europe, though for this it was by no means untrained.

In Scotland on schemes on the banks of the Tees, the Battalion had gathered a rich harvest of experience, and on a lake near Flers all ranks had the opportunity to remind themselves of the mechanics of river crossings.

The Pioneers revised their knowledge of building a class V raft and drivers were practised in driving on and off a raft and in motoring across different types of bridging both by day and by night.

Finally, everyone learned about the capacity and performance of a storm boat which had been produced as a means of crossing large rivers. The Battalion therefore, was not unacquainted with the technique of river crossing when it embarked upon this enterprise.

We set out from the area of the Seine on 16th September knowing that we would soon be called upon to carry out an operation of this kind. The distance was about 230 miles and in that time the Battalion passed through many towns and villages that have become household words in the history of the Battalion. We passed by Amiens, and then a whole series of names: Albert, Bapaume, Flesquieres, Moeuvres, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Mons: which recalled the activities of the second Battalion in the last war.

Later on we came to Louvain and older members of the Battalion were able to revive more personal memories of those days in France and Belgium before Dunkirk. Some of them even managed to slip off the main road and dally for an hour or two at a little place called Lezennes where the Battalion spent nine happy months in 1939/40. A tumultuous welcome was received.

The Battalion arrived at Petit Brogel on the South side of the Escaut Canal in the afternoon of 17th September. Here we heard that the task of the Brigade was to broaden the bridgehead over the canal made by 50 Division some four miles further west; and this was to be done in the next two or three days.

Little could be done on that day, for the men were tired after a journey of about 220 miles in cramped conditions. Early next morning we heard that the crossing would be done on that night, 18/19 September. It was clear that the time factor in this operation would still by a thick ground mist, though later mitigated by artificial moonlight which had been arranged for the attack.

It was a night without rain or cold, morale was high, and all ranks confident in the success of the operation.

At 2100 hrs the Commanding Officer attended a co-ordinating conference at Brigade, where final details were settled between Commanders and Supporting Arms. Then he went down to the Command Post which had earlier been established in a house about 200 yards from the canal bank.

Communication to Brigade was duplicated in that there was a 22 set in the Command Post and a 19 set some 200 yards away manned by the Adjutant, Captain K. G. Perona-Wright, who had a line direct to the Command Post. Within the Battalion the Command Post was in contact by 18 set with companies and additionally with each crossing place by line.

By 2315 hrs forward companies were in the assembly areas and anxiety was soon felt about the assault boats which had not arrived. It subsequently turned out that the sapper NCO in charge of the boats failed in the dark to make contact with the Officer Commanding S Company, Major T. N. S. Wheeler, at the rendezvous.

Infantry carrying assault boats in preparation for crossing the Meuse-Escaut canal at Lille-St Hubert, 19 September 1944 (IWM)

When they did finally arrive C and B Companies both supplied their own carrying parties, and valuable assistance was rendered also by the Pioneer Platoon in a great effort to get the boats launched without serious delay. This was the period when our guns opened up and the enemy was not slow to respond with accurate Mortar fire. Both companies continued the good work in these trying conditions and sustained casualties.

Infantry carrying assault boats in preparation for crossing the Meuse-Escaut canal at Lille-St Hubert, 19 September 1944 (IWM)

At this stage Rifleman Greene one of the batman of B Company, drew upon himself particular distinction. While forming up with the boats, mortar fire came once more from the other side, and the men went to ground. With great coolness and far surpassing his normal duties he continued to erect the assault boats and at the same time urged others to do likewise. This great example produced the necessary effect.

Both companies now pressed forward with great determination. In B Company a compass bearing had been taken from the assembly point to the canal by Captain H. M. Gaffikin so that the problem of direction finding to the canal was solved. There remained the difficulty of the ground.

After struggling across the first little stream, they had then to launch the boats into the canal. This involved hauling the craft up a steep bushy incline of 45 degrees for some 15 feet. This was extremely heavy and tiring work and, on the right, had it not been for the example and determination of the two leading Platoon Commanders, Lts H. D. D. O'Neill and E. G. Barker, and CSM Lutton, much valuable time might have been lost.

Lieutenant H.D.D. O'Neill - Platoon Commander C Company 

On the left enemy mortar fire began to disorganise the boat loads, but Major J. C. S. G. de Longueuil swiftly reorganised and encouraged his men, urging them forward into the boats with great zeal and himself crossing with the first flight though originally he had intended going with the second flight with his Headquarters.

The crossing itself was uneventful, though at one point a hail of bullets cut the water not far away from B Company's boats. On the left the principal excitement occurred when one of the boats slipped away with one man in it, but some stout paddling soon restored this position.

C Company landed and moved forward towards their objectives without incident, and established a small bridgehead about 500 yards deep. They had hardly reported in position when a second message was received that a counter attack was being made from the left flank. Machine gun fire was coming from the tow path at about 100 yards range, a prelude to an attack with rifles and grenades.

This danger to the open flank had been appreciated before the crossing and two dismounted sections of the Carrier Platoon had been attached to the company to strengthen the left flank. But even with this assistance the left flank remained an anxiety, and, in the dark, this attack penetrated the Carrier screen into Company Headquarters where Captain L. F. Laving, the Second in Command, was killed.

Captain L F Laving - C Company Second in Command

The situation for the moment was serious, but Major de Longueuil quickly gathered together all available men and repelled this invasion with great determination. The Boche left two dead behind and many more were thought to be wounded. Immediately the Company Commander asked the Commanding Officer for further reinforcement for the left flank, whereupon the Commanding Officer ordered D Company to cross, to safeguard this dangerous flank until daylight and then to advance to Ds own objectives.

On the right, B Company had quite a different story to tell. When the whole company was safely across the canal the advance to the first objective began. This was a pathway 200 yards inland which was reached safely. There was quite a lot of machine gun fire from the Boche firing across the front, and some 8 cm mortar bombs dropped close by but there were no casualties, and the advance continued on a compass bearing to the final objective, a point on the main road just North of the little village. This was made good without further trouble and a firm position established upon it.

Patrols were now sent out along the main road Northwards towards the railway and Southwards into the village. Both confirmed that the Boche had positions in the area of the level crossing, but was in strength in the village.

It soon became clear however that B Company's position was utterly unknown to the party in the village, for German Medical Orderlies evacuating some casualties fell into our hands and they were astounded at being taken.

At this point Captain Gaffikin spoke to the Commanding Officer on the wireless. He explained the situation and felt that in the dark he could not safely enter the village himself without someone taking over his position and constituting a firm base while he cleared the houses. Accordingly Lt Colonel Harris ordered A Company to cross as soon as possible and then to join B Company. Officer Commanding A Company, Major Sweeny, MC, was then to decide in consultation with Captain Gaffikin, which company was best placed for clearing the village.

At 0345 hrs A Company crossed the canal and on reaching the far bank was met by two guides from B Company who led A Company to their area. The crossing had been without incident, but on this move a curious event took place. At one of the halts an NCO sat down by a haystack, turned to speak to the soldier sitting beside him, and discovered that his neighbour was a German soldier. Both he and his weapon, which happened to be a machine gun, were put out of harms way.

When the companies joined up it was decided that as B Company was already in position, B would therefore remain fast while A Company cleared the village from the North.

Scarcely had this plan been set in motion when the sound of a scuffle was heard in the ditch and five Germans debouched from it to surrender to Lt M. Betty, Commander of the leading platoon. Then the first house was approached. Some resistance was offered but when machine gun and rifle fire were vigorously returned some 10 Germans gave up the struggle, came out and were made prisoners.

By this time it was getting light, though visibility was obscured for some time by a thick morning mist. Suddenly the noise of horse drawn transport was heard approaching from the village and then two farm carts emerged from the mist, loaded with Germans, a variety of machine guns, bazooka, and small arms, and an assortment of looted food and drink.

Our men engaged them at close range, taking advantage of having caught this little convoy entirely unawares. The Boche soon recovered and with great agility removed the guns from the trailers and brought them into action. The resistance was not, however, long sustained. A section of Lt Betty's platoon quickly slipped round to a flank and a well placed 36 grenade from Sjt Peel clinched the matter: the whole party surrendered.

More resistance was met in the next house, but again this was subdued by Bren Gun fire and five more prisoners taken. With this group there was a sapper of our own Division who had been captured whilst on a reconnaissance with his officer the night before. He had spent an exciting night with the Boche and told how bewildered they were on discovering that they were surrounded and cut off.

A Company from that point had no further difficulty in clearing down to the canal, so that now, bridging could begin immediately. A Company returned to the North of the village and Major Sweeny was given fresh orders from the Commanding Officer. As the Lincolns, who had battled through the night against much heavier opposition than we had to face, had all companies across on the right, the Commanding Officer decided that our main danger remained the left flank.

Consequently, D Company having at first light gone forward to the railway crossing, some 700 yards beyond C Company, A was now brought over from the right flank to look after the left. Just before this, Major Sweeny, MC, had begun to advance towards his original objective, the railway crossing, but had been troubled by heavy machine gun fire from this position. One burst unfortunately killed 2/Lt J. Morgan, a young platoon commander who had recently joined us.

Bridging and rafting were now going ahead with great gusto and by 0900 hrs Anti Tank Guns and ancillary Jeeps were being shipped across. By 0930 hrs the Anti Tank Guns were positioned, a section being with each of C, B and D Companies. At about that time priority transport began to cross the sappers Class 9 Bridge, so that by 1000 hrs the Battalion can be said to have been firm, secure, and prepared for any eventuality.

In this attack we inflicted the following losses on the enemy: in men, 4 killed 44 taken prisoner, and a substantial number believed wounded; in material, one 22 mm gun, 12 machine guns, 8 X 8 cm mortars, bazookas, 5 cm mortars, and a host of rifles and other small arms with large quantities of ammunition for each weapon. As against that our losses were 2 Officers killed, 1 Other Rank killed, and 13 wounded.

There can be no doubt that much of this success can be attributed to the manner in which the intention of the Commanding Officer was carried out. The key to the defence of the canal was the small village opposite Lille St Hubert. The defences there controlled the only bridging site opposite the main. Lille St Hubert - Achel Road. Additionally they covered the ground to the east and could stop any threat to their left flank, in fact, at 0215 hrs the Lincolns operating on the right of the main road, in reporting three companies across the canal, stated that they were being held up by fire from these buildings and requested us to clear them with all speed. Nor can it be doubted that we should have sustained grievous losses had an attack been launched direct from the left. Many lives were saved by the prescient decision of Captain Gaffikin to strike Northwards through the dark to the road and then swing South to clear the village backwards.

The excellence of signal communication throughout the operation also deserves comment. Both the Commanding Officer and Brigade were kept fully informed of what was going on and at critical moments the Commanding Officer was always able to speak directly to Company Commanders concerned.

It is a tribute to the signals that Battalion Headquarters was able to remain on the South bank until the completion of the operation, thus avoiding the interruption and possible loss of contact which a crossing during the battle might have entailed. In fact Battalion Headquarters was not set up on the other side until 0945 hrs, its constituents crossing soon after 0900 hrs.

In view of the short notice given for this operation, the lack of full preparation and the absence of detailed knowledge of the enemy and his dispositions, the Battalion had good reason to be satisfied with the part it played. Subsequently the MC was awarded to Major de Longueuil whose handling of C Company had done much to ensure the success of the operation, and the MM to Rifleman Greene for outstanding devotion to duty.

Major J C S G de Longueuil receiving Military Cross from Montgomery in 28 April 1945 in a barn near near the bank of the River Elbe after he had transferred to become Second in Command of 1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles, part of 6th Airborne Division (IWM).

20th to 30th September - Marheeze and Deurne

After the action at Lille St Hubert, the Class 40 Bridge, built by the Royal Engineers of our Division, permitted the passage of 11 Armoured Division, and after this our Divisional role was to follow up the armour, taking over important points as these were overcome, and also ensuring the protection of their line of communication.

German resistance in these circumstances became almost guerilla warfare, because the rapid advance of armour split up without destroying their forces and these operated independently until such time as they could link up again with their own forces. The quantity and extent of the woods in this part of Holland afforded ample cover for their activities and so the utmost vigilance had always to be maintained by our own troops.

Our first move of this kind was to Marheeze, which lay some 16 miles North East of the Escaut. During this march we crossed the frontier between Belgium and Holland and the reception in the villages and towns of both countries can only be described as riotous.

Our pipers played us through to the delight of the civilians, and, when we reached Holland, it was a happy coincidence that the pipers saffron kilts toned with the gay orange rosettes which were the national emblems of the Fighting Dutch. The streets were lined with these cheering folk, so that vehicles following the marching troops could with difficulty find a way through.

The Dutch matched this great reception by their hospitality to us in Marheeze and subsequently in Deurne, where many members of the Battalion made friendships which they hoped to renew at an early date.

At Deurne, some 20 miles North of Marheeze, across the Helmond Canal, the German was at once closer to us and more organised. He was holding the line of the Deurne Canal about two miles East of the town and had outposts well forward across the water, and though we were not in constant touch with him in this position, fighting patrols of company strength went out on two successive days and had no difficulty in locating him.

The country down to the canal was flat and open, with, however, enough trees and ditches to allow covered approaches. Moreover the Boche was watchful and handled vigorously with mortar and sniper fire any observed movement. Training of the previous months was now given the reality of battle conditions, for the utmost skill in observation and fieldcraft was demanded.

These patrols were not carried out without loss; 'D' Company on the second day lost six men wounded. Against that, one German was killed and much damage was thought to have been inflicted by calculated artillery and mortar supporting fire. We ended the month of September moving out of Deurne, but having benefited greatly from our stay in it.

1st to 12th October 1944 - Cuyk

We left Deurne at the end of September and moved up to the little village of Cuyk on the West bank of the Dutch Meuse. At this point we were no more than 5 miles from the German frontier though actually facing Boche on the opposite bank of the river.

We thought at this time that our Division was to be employed in the attack across the frontier, and preparations had reached the stage of reconnaissance by Commanding Officers of the ground over which the battle was to be fought. But this attack was postponed by very high authority and soon we heard that 3 British Infantry Division was to deal with that pocket of enemy resistance that remained West of the Meuse and based on Overloon, Venray and Venlo.

The days of Cuyk were spent largely in rest, as we knew that we would soon be in battle in whichever direction it was decided to send us. Mortaring and shelling was very intensive when we first arrived and casualties were suffered by two companies A and D - in the town, but gradually the Boche on the far bank of the Meuse was pushed further and further South until eventually their shells worried us little.

We had to remain watchful, however, because being so close to the German boundary fifth column work became more of a probability. We had one positive piece of evidence of this.

One morning at about 0500 hrs a volley of shells from a heavy German artillery piece landed without warning in the area of the Battalion Headquarters, one shell scoring a direct hit upon the Command Post, fortunately injuring nobody, but the position of Headquarters was changed with great speed.

12th to 13th October - Overloon

On 12th October the Battalion moved some 10 miles South of Cuyk to St Anthonis and here we heard details of the plan. 8th Brigade was to begin by capturing Overloon, then 9th Brigade was to clear the woods to the West and South West of Overloon, and finally 185 Brigade were to pass through 8th Brigade and capture Venray.

On the evening of the first day - the day of the 8th Brigade attack on Overloon - the Brigadier and the Commanding Officer, Lt-Colonel Harris, went forward to see as much as possible of the woods that the Brigade was to attack.

The attack had gone well and Overloon was reported taken, but on the right, pockets of enemy were still being snuffed out, and reconnaissance was hindered by mortar and machine gun fire, as well as by the fading light. Gradually, however, a plan was hammered out and, to initiate the operation, 2 RUR was to clear and consolidate the first of the two large woods South and South east of Overloon which, for convenience, we shall call Wood [X] and Wood Y.

An assembly area was fixed in a wood a mile North of Wood X .and the start line for the attack was to be the Overloon - Oploo road. Zero was fixed provisionally for 0800 hrs, but routes from the assembly area that were passable and not mined had to be reconnoitred for both infantry and tanks and Zero was eventually put back to 0900 hrs.

In support we were glad to find two squadrons of Churchills of the Grenadier Guards, old friends with whom we had trained in FLERS. Flails were present to deal with mines reported to be on a considerable scale by 8th Brigade, and flame-throwers were also at our disposal.

The Gunners were shooting a timed programme at the beginning of the attack and were thereafter available for immediate support. Typhoons could also be called upon when a suitable target presented itself.

Next morning Reveille for the Battalion was at 0300 hrs and at 0400 hrs the march to the assembly area began. Breakfast was then consumed and proved most welcome after marching four miles in the pitch darkness.

Meanwhile at 0600 hrs the Commanding officer was at 8th Brigade Headquarters to learn the latest positions on the front. He heard that the South Lancashires now had a company in the Northern end of Wood X but detailed information about the move could only be gained at the South Lancashires Headquarters. Here we found that this company had established itself without much trouble by first light.

There were apparently few Boche on the ground, though mortaring and shelling - quiet by night - might prove difficult for troops moving in the open by day. With this information Company Commanders and the Tank troop leaders, who had all met the Commanding Officer, married up as far as they could, and then all went off to find suitable routes towards the Wood.

At 0815 hrs the Commanding Officer held a final co-ordinating conference. A Company were to lead on a one company front, as the Wood X was narrow to begin with and would only give cover to a single company at a time.

Preliminary objectives were fixed within the woods and the final objective was the most Southerly edge of the wood. The tanks were to give as much assistance as they could shooting us into the wood and then covering the clearings up to the wood, as they could not enter the wood itself.

At 0900 hrs A Company under Major Sweeny moved forward to its objective. Heavy mortaring and shelling was coming down though mainly along the line of the Overloon - Oploo road, well North East of Wood X. Major Sweeny was therefore able to avoid many casualties by keeping well to the North side of the road for as long as possible and only crossing it when the company was immediately North of the wood.

Once in the wood he had no further trouble and though he failed to locate the Company of South Lancashires in the Northern edge of Wood X, the company went forward and occupied its objectives.

D Company under Major Bird followed A Company and had no sooner passed through them than some of the difficulties of this battle became apparent. The wood was extremely variable; in some place thick enough to be impenetrable, in others it did not exist at all. German positions and abandoned equipment testified to their recent occupation.

Snipers were encountered almost at once necessitating thorough searching of every inch of the ground; mopping them up was inevitably a slow and laborious process. Sjt Schofield did excellent work here. He had hardly set off with his platoon in one direction when a burst of Sten fire and a few curt orders produced a German corporal out of the bushes doubling at the point of the Sten.

Returning to the chase, Sjt Schofield's platoon rounded up three more in quick succession while others were seen, to be fleeing back through the woods. In the Southerly part it was more uniform, with pine trees of medium size, hedged about with foliage and undergrowth through which a way could be forced without great difficulty.

Throughout the wood there were soft and sandy tracks which were treacherous for vehicles because of their nature and also because none of them had been cleared of mines. Neither these tracks nor the shape of the wood itself bore much relation to the map, even with a revised trace from an air photograph, so that one of the principal difficulties was finding the way.

All these factors combined to reduce the speed of the operation and it was some time before we heard D Company report their objectives - half way through the wood - secure. Some mortar fire had troubled D Company as they moved up to the wood and Lt Curran was among the casualties to be wounded by shrapnel.

Once in the wood, however, it slackened off and although D Company lost Rifleman Guy in a almost direct hit from a mortar bomb, they could claim one German killed and six prisoners by the time they had reached their first objective.

Since they had met no opposition the Commanding Officer directed them to continue forward to the final objective and sent C Company, under Major de Longueuil to take over the ground that D had covered. These moves were completed without incident and soon Major Bird reported his company installed in the left hand forward edge of the wood.

Shortly after 1400 hrs, Captain Gaffikin led B Company forward to take over the right hand corner of the objective. He passed successively through A and C Companies and then liaised with Major Bird of D Company before proceeding further. Soon after he resumed his advance, the leading platoon came to a clearing and was shot at by small arms and bazooka fire from the opposite side.

No casualties were sustained, but by the time the platoon had deployed for action, the Boche had taken to his heels. B Company pressed on but saw no further signs of enemy activity before reaching and consolidating their objectives. Suddenly two Mark IV German tanks were seen moving in a South Easterly direction across the front. They were, unfortunately out of Piat range, but Captain Baudains second in command of the company, engaged them with a rifle forcing the tank commanders to keep their heads down.

Next morning our sentries saw Germans moving about in a little strip of wood opposite their position and others cycling away from it. Vigorous Bren fire and accurate sniping from Lt O'Neill and others killed at least two Germans and was thought to have wounded many more.

Battalion Headquarters moved up close to A Company soon after B Company had moved off towards the final objective. There after the evening and night were spent in dealing with problems of supply. No vehicle could be brought nearer than five hundred yards to Battalion Headquarters. Trucks had attempted it earlier but several had been bogged in the soft sandy tracks.

The tracks were in such a state that no Jeep could get further than A Company, the rear company, and in any case none of them had been swept for mines. Consequently all food had to be manhandled up to companies: so too did blankets and greatcoats later on. This entailed long and hard work by working parties who had begun the day at 0300 hrs that morning, and again most people had little sleep that night.

13 October Fatalities
- Rifleman Melvern Roy Guy 14691055 (Served in D Company and killed by an almost direct hit from a mortar bomb aged 21. Son of Melvern and Rachel Guy of Risca, Monmouthshire. Buried in Overloon War Cemetery, grave IV.D.8)
- Rifleman John Irvine 14688534 (Taken to the RAP on 13 October and died of his wounds on 15th. Son of David and Agnes Irvine of Paddington. Buried in Overloon War Cemetery, grave IV.D.12)
- Rifleman Richard Scott (Served in A Company and killed by shrapnel. Born in Belfast in 1922. Buried in Overloon War Cemetery, grave IV.D.9)

14th to 16th October 1944 - Overloon and Venray

The next day 14th October was something of a respite, for we held firm in our positions while the Lincolns passed through us to attack Wood Y.

Enemy mortaring and shelling troubled all companies and one volley from a Nebelwerfer struck the Headquarters of the Anti-Tank platoon severely wounding the second in command, Lt Rapkins, who subsequently died of wounds, and grazing the commander, Captain Gray.

Under these conditions small parties from forward companies came back to eat their food behind Battalion Headquarters thus avoiding the business of manhandling it. The condition of the tracks had improved during the night. A Bulldozer had worked ceaselessly to clear a way to the Southern end of the wood and its path had been checked for mines and taped.

But it was still not possible to reach D or B Companies with a vehicle and so all the requirements of these companies had still to be manhandled from the track to them.

The Lincolns that afternoon launched a highly successful attack on Wood Y, losing a large number of casualties but acquitting themselves with great gallantry, and by 0530 hrs the whole Battalion was consolidated in Wood Y, the Eastern part of which they had completely cleared of Boche. They had suffered mostly from German defensive fire and at the beginning of their advance many of these shells landed among our own forward companies.

Among the casualties was one of our Dutch Interpreters (Sergeant van der Burgt) who was unfortunately killed when hit by a mortar bomb. In order to protect their rear and also their right, it was decided to send two of our companies to support them.

Under over of darkness A and C Companies crossed the open ground between Wood X and Wood Y. Unluckily just as A Company - the second -was entering Wood Y a vicious series of salvoes from a Nebelwerfer landed among them in a veritable hail of shells. Two men were killed and ten others injured. This was sheer bad luck, as it was not quite dark, and there was no question of observed fire having been brought to bear.

Bert Weymans' November 1944 drawing of Field Graves of Dutch Interpreter Sergeant W.C. van der Burgt and six 2 RUR Rifleman who were subsequently re-buried at Overloon War Cemetery

Next morning Battalion Headquarters moved forward of the area that C Company had vacated in Wood X. We were hardly dug into this new location when the Brigadier arrived with orders for renewed advance: 8th Brigade were now to attack Venray from the West debouching from Wood Y which the Lincolns were to hold as a firm base.

Simultaneously 2 RUR were to advance from Wood Y to occupy Kleindorp, a hamlet about 600 yards to the South. Our attack was to be without gunner support because the whole Divisional Artillery was to support 8th Brigades attack, it was therefore extremely important to slip companies forward into Kleindorp at certain moments only, selecting with care those periods when German defensive and harassing fire was not being directed at the 8th Brigades assault.

That night D and B Companies, followed by Battalion Headquarters, moved across from Wood X to Wood Y in preparation for an advance at about 0900 hours the following day. It rained during the night and next day, 16th October, the weather was unsettled, producing heavy showers in the afternoon. None the less D Company left Wood Y at 0930 hrs and advanced towards Kleindorp.

It soon became apparent the Boche had withdrawn behind the line of the River Beek, some half a mile South of the village. Major Bird soon reported himself in position on the cross-roads in Kleindorp and that he was patrolling forward to detect any Boche that might be in the vicinity.

Meanwhile back in Wood Y the support for 8th Brigades attack was building up, tanks, flails, flame-throwers and infantry all waiting to go forward as soon as the Beek had been bridged. Mortaring and shelling grew correspondingly intense and though it apparently did little or no damage, Lt-Colonel Harris decided not to bring B Company out of their positions until 1430 hrs: then he sent them forward into Kleindorp during a lull in the shelling. Captain Gaffikin soon reported his Company in position on Ds right without any casualties.

Soon fresh orders reached the Commanding Officer. 9th Brigade was now squeezed out by the advance of 8th Brigade on the left and the arrival of the II Armoured Division who were driving Eastwards across our front to the South of Kleindorp. So 9th Brigade were now to pull out and relieve a remaining unit of 11 Armoured Division North East of Overloon, with the role of preventing a counter attack towards Overloon, while our own attack was going into Venray.

This relief meant a four mile march along tracks which had been ploughed up by carriers and tanks and then waterlogged by rain. But this mattered little when it was realised that we were at last out of the woods and back in a position where part of the Battalion were able to get under some sort of cover. By 2130 hrs that night the Battalion had reported in position.

Our position here was in reserve behind the KOSB who were in contact with the enemy opposite Smakt along the Boxmeer - Wanssum railway. Then we heard that we might have to resume the attack and clear the large wooded area about half a mile South of the position.

Reconnaissances down to Company Commanders were made, but they were in vain. Once Venray was captured, the offensive on the front was halted in favour of a full scale attack elsewhere.

October 1944 -

So now 185 Brigade came out of the "Pine" for a rest and we exchanged places with the KSLI who were in a position half a mile North East of Venray in the area of the Reservoirs. Our role here was to find out by offensive patrolling all we could about enemy dispositions and habits so that when the attack on this sector was resumed, all available information would be on hand.

We soon found, however, that the Boche on this front was comparatively quiet, content to sit and nurse the wounds he had recently sustained.

Shelling and mortaring - little by day generally rose to a crescendo between 1700 and 2100 hrs though casualties - including the death of our second Dutch Interpreter just attached to us - were very light.

The whole Battalion was well dug in and most people had sufficient respect for the Nebelwerfer and its sister mortars to take no chances with it. Meanwhile by night patrols, mainly listening and reconnaissance patrols, we gradually, built up a picture of the enemy dispositions and strength and our knowledge was amplified by deserters who came in by twos and threes within a few days of our taking over this position.

Efforts were made after careful reconnaissance to capture a prisoner but these were frustrated by the increasing lightness of the nights, and by the fact that the German sentries located by a reconnaissance patrol one night, could not be spotted on the night when the fighting patrol went out.

Life in this position was quiet but it was also boring because double guards had to be maintained by night and section sentries by day: vigilance had to be thoroughly maintained. In order to permit of the maximum rest possible twelve men per company in turn spent 48 hours at A Echelon at St Anthonis - some eight miles away - and in HQ and 8 Companies, specialist platoons were kept at minimum strength, commensurate with maximum security, while the balance lived at A Echelon. Back in St Anthonis there were films and many were able to visit the Divisional Club in Helmond. A smaller number went to Brussels for 48 hours, priority in this scheme being given to those who had fought with the Battalion since D Day. By this means the discomfort and tedium of living for long periods in slit trenches was mitigated and by the end of October nearly every man had enjoyed some break from the monotonous routine of "Slitters".

Most of us would in retrospect agree with Andrew Marrell's description of Holland, even though we might not now subscribe to his opinion of its people. He called it "Vomit of the Sea, given to the Dutch by just propriety."

The weather was indeed the principal bogey of the month and for the first time we obtained an inkling of what a Dutch winter means. Holland is a damp country and the flooding of its multiplicity of rivers and streams, imposed a check upon operations in the field.

So, taken as a whole, this period was for the Battalion one of comparative inertia. But as in music, the rest is often more significant than the chord that precedes it, so in the life of a fighting Battalion, relaxation and the pauses for rebuilding its structure are often more significant than the stress and strain of action, which is more spectacular and more memorable.

November 1944 - Overloon and Veulen

We spent the month of November holding and strengthening our grip upon the ground which the Division had won in the battle for Venray.

The first three days of it were spent in positions around the reservoirs which we had already held since the middle of October. In those three days, we had two strange contacts with the Boche.

On the night of All Saints, one of his small patrols on an advanced reconnaissance, came upon an anti-tank gun which was sighted on A Company's right flank. The sentry could see three men in the darkness, and not being satisfied with the reply to his challenge, opened fire with his Sten gun.

The patrol withdrew but one of its number re-appeared a few minutes later along some of the companys slit trenches. He danced about the slitters crying "Tommy, come out" but all he evoked was a stream of small arms fire from the vigilant sentries. He was hit but was able to withdraw and seemed to make his escape into the darkness.

The company immediately stood to and a platoon went out to chase the intruders. No trace of them was seen that night but next morning the body of one of the patrol was found in a ditch in front of the company lines, proving the accuracy of our sentry's shooting.

Two nights later a party from D Company, assisted by the Pioneer Platoon under Lt Shimmin, was laying a belt of mines across our front. Inevitably they made a noise and this must have attracted the attention of the Boche.

It was a clear moonlit night and a small Boche patrol was able to infiltrate, under cover of a wood, between our covering party and those who were laying mines. In a matter of seconds they opened fire with a Bazooka, injuring two of our men, and, before counter action could be taken. the patrol had made off into the woods not to be seen or heard again.

This was almost our first direct experience of vigorous and offensive patrolling by the Boche and we saw something more of it in the next position about a mile East of Overloon.

Here we were holding another part of the same line opposite Smakt and Maashees at the most Northerly end of the Boche bridgehead West of the Meuse. In many respects it was a position without undue appeal: living conditions were slit trenches which flooded all too easily and then gradually crumbled, while tactically it was insecure, for companies were spread out over a vast expanse of wooded country to such an extent indeed that it took the best part of two hours to walk round all the Battalion positions.

In spite of this, however, the Boche was less concerned with our own front than with our neighbour; a Squadron of the Reconnaissance Regt who covered our left. While they were dealing nightly with patrols varying in strength from a few men to a platoon equipped with captured Brens and Stens and closely supported by artillery, we were left in comparative peace.

Never the less we were glad to leave this position after four days and move into reserve at St Anthonis. Most of the Battalion knew it well. I A and B Echelon had been there for almost a month and every man had had at least one spell of 48 hours resting there. Many friendships were now renewed. We also experienced the consequences of any rest period, complete checks of AF G 1098 stores, MT and clothing and equipment being carried out. But there was much to do besides these necessary acts of officialdom.

Large parties visited cinema and ENSA shows in St Anthonis, Deurne and Helmond. Others went to the Corps Rest Camp and to Brussels, though these parties had by now become part of the Battalion routine. At the same time Field Marshal Montgomery visited the Division and decorated, from the Battalion, Captain J. Montgomery, MC, C/Sjt W. Sharkey, DCM, Cpl W. Reid, MM and Rfn A. Charles, MM, all for distinguished conduct in the early battles.

We were also visited by the Commander of the Wing of Typhoons that had supported us in recent operations and tokens of co-operation were duly exchanged. A Rifleman presented the Wing Commander with a captured Luger pistol and in return received a handsomely mounted RAF badge. This was an immensely successful occasion and a suitable concourse of press reporters wrote it up colourfully for the home press.

Finally, the Commanding Officer found this opportunity to speak to the Battalion as a whole. He had spoken in Hawick and again when we left Caen, on a few days rest before crossing the Orne to attack Troarn. Now, on this third occasion, he was able to review five months of the campaign and point out bow favourably our casualties compared with those of other Battalions in proportion to the amount of fighting that we and they had done.

He forecast further fighting for the Battalion in the near future, and events soon proved him correct. Soon we heard that our Division was to take part in a renewed attack to eliminate the enemy bridgehead West of the Meuse. It was to be initiated from the South and launched in a North Easterly direction against the weakest flank of the Boche position.

Within the Division our Brigade was to begin the attack and this necessitated a move to positions South of Venray so that we could then in our turn attack North Eastwards towards Wanssum on the Maas.

On 1st November the Battalion moved from Overloon to the village of Veulen, about a mile South of Venray. There we spent some days waiting upon the progress of the offensive further South and when it came our turn to attack, we found that the Boche had gone leaving behind him a formidable series of minefields and roadblocks.

These and the mud, which was universal, precluded the possibility of a swift chase, and though with the other two Battalions we kept leapfrogging forward, no further contact with the enemy was made, On 26th November, units of the 15th Scottish Division had driven up from Horst across our front through Tienray to Blitterswijk and on the 27th we were ordered to relieve them in the area Blitterswijk - Meerlo in order to release them for mopping up operations further South.

Only on the night of the relief did we - or our Scottish friends learn that, contrary to general belief, there remained a considerable pocket of enemy on this side of the canal, based on Wanssum - or that part of it which lay on the east bank of the canal. We were left with the task of eliminating this and so making good the whole line of the Meuse.

It is as well at the outset to gain a clear picture of the ground upon which this nucleus of resistance was based. Wanssum itself is a large village split in two by a broad canal which draws into the Meuse half a mile further North. The two parts are normally connected by a causeway which had, however, been thoroughly destroyed by the Germans during their retreat.

British troops were already installed in the Western half but were cut off from the other side by this expanse of water. Blitterswijk is about 3000 yards due East of Wanssum, and Helling, a mere hamlet, lies about 700 yards to the South. Good roads ran East to Blitterswijk and Southwards to Helling and to Meerlo where part of the Battalion was already in position.

Along the axis of these two roads the country was extremely flat and open though between Helling and Blitterswijk was an area of undulating ground well covered with woods of varying density. North East of Wanssum lay the Meuse and another Macadam road ran down to the river at which point a ferry could then convey men and vehicles to Well on the right bank of the river.

The perimeter of the defensive positions which the Germans had taken up, was clearly defined by a length of single dannert wire which ran from the canal across the Helling - Meerlo road seven or eight hundred yards South of Helling and then swung away North East towards Blitterswijk - crossed the Wanssum - Blitterswijk road half a mile West of Blitterswijk and then carried on North to the Meuse. Though not a formidable obstacle in itself this wire was known to have mines and booby traps attached to it.

November 30th was fixed as the day for the attack. It was to be done by night, as preliminary reconnaissance had revealed the flat and coverless nature of the ground. We had no reason to suspect sustained opposition because since this offensive had begun, the tendency of the Boche was to cut and run, rather than face a set piece attack.

It seemed improbable that he would continue to hold this bridgehead for long because by November 30th he had undoubtedly withdrawn all his effectives behind the river, excepting the rearguard which was holding the pocket. Their task was done and it seemed logical that they too should go.

The Commanding Officer decided to attack with two companies with D Company attacking westward from Blitterswijk and C Company northwards from the outskirts of Meerlo. D Company was to make good to the woods and houses about 1500 yards beyond the wire along the main road to Blitterswijk, and C Company was to capture Helling and then push on into Wanssum.

Zero hour was fixed at 0500 hrs; this would allow, it was hoped, time for C Company to get into Wanssum and under cover before the Boche could bring down observed fire upon the town from the opposite. B Company were to be held in reserve in Meerlo but were not expected to be committed.